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FOREWORD
Relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, two
important regional powers, have hit a low point. The
two countries have not only broken diplomatic relations but have been engaged in so-called proxy wars
in the region, most notably in Syria and Yemen. They
have also engaged in sectarian diatribes that have
exacerbated Sunni-Shia tensions in the area and have
accused each other of subversion in each other’s countries. The Iran nuclear deal that was finalized in 2015
was supposed to ease regional tensions in addition to
precluding Tehran from developing nuclear weapons,
but the aspirational goal of the former has not transpired for a variety of reasons.
Although the United States has been involved in
the Gulf region for many decades, understanding the
complex relations between countries in the area has
long been a challenge. The mix of histories, religions,
and nationalisms has at times been combustible, and
there are often unintended consequences of certain
policy decisions.
Gregory Aftandilian, a Middle East expert with
long-standing government and academic experience,
in writing this monograph, helps us understand the
current conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran. He also
presents cogent recommendations for U.S. policymakers to ease tensions between the two antagonists, helps
to dispel the perception in the region that the United
States is taking part in a sectarian war, and avoids
policies that could alienate the young generation of
Iranians who are favorably disposed to the United
States and who want better relations with Washington, DC. At the same time, the monograph also
recommends U.S. policies that would ease Saudi anxieties about Iran.
vii

It is hoped that this monograph will be of use to
U.S. policymakers and U.S. Army officers as they deal
with long-term security challenges and opportunities
in the important Gulf region.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute and
U.S. Army War College Press

viii

ABOUT THE AUTHOR
GREGORY AFTANDILIAN is an independent consultant, writer, and lecturer, having spent over 21 years
in U.S. Government service, most recently on Capitol
Hill. He was a foreign policy adviser to Congressman
Chris Van Hollen from 2007 to 2008, a professional
staff member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and foreign policy adviser to Senator Paul Sarbanes from 2000 to 2004, and a foreign policy fellow
to Senator Edward Kennedy in 1999. Prior to holding
these positions, Mr. Aftandilian worked for 13 years
as a Middle East analyst at the U.S. Department of
State where he was a recipient of the Department’s
Superior Honor Award for his analyses on Egypt. His
other government experiences include analytical work
for the U.S. Department of Defense and the Library of
Congress. He was also a research fellow at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University
from 2006 to 2007 and an international affairs fellow
at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York from
1991 to 1992. In addition, Mr. Aftandilian has worked
as a consultant on Egyptian affairs for the National
Democratic Institute for International Affairs and is
an adjunct faculty member at Boston University and
George Mason University, as well as a non-resident
fellow at the Arab Center in Washington, DC. Mr.
Aftandilian is the author of Egypt’s Bid for Arab Leadership: Implications for U.S. Policy (1993); Looking Forward:
An Integrated Strategy for Supporting Democracy and
Human Rights in Egypt (2009), and several monographs
published by the Strategic Studies Institute. Mr. Aftandilian holds a B.A. in history from Dartmouth College,
an M.A. in Middle Eastern studies from the University
of Chicago, and an M.S. in international relations from
the London School of Economics.
ix

SUMMARY
This monograph examines how the United States
should preserve and protect its long-term interests in
the Middle East region by maneuvering carefully and
strategically in the Saudi-Iranian conflict. The monograph first analyzes the history of the conflict between
these two countries and shows that, while these two
regional powers were rivals, they were not necessarily enemies and cooperated at times. It then traces
their recent conflict back to the Iranian revolution and
brings it up-to-date with their support for opposing
sides in proxy wars in the region, taking part in sectarian diatribes, and the breaking of diplomatic relations. It also discusses how the former Barack Obama
administration hoped for better U.S.-Iranian relations
in the wake of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal that it negotiated with the other P5+1 countries (China, France,
Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—
the five permanent members of the United Nations
Security Council—plus Germany), and how that did
not transpire because of the attitudes of the hardliners
in Iran who are wary of any rapprochement with the
United States. In addition, the Saudis were distrustful
of Iran, believed the nuclear deal had significant shortcomings, and were not pleased that President Obama
called on both countries to learn to coexist with each
other in the neighborhood. To assuage Saudi concerns
and to help protect the important sea lanes between
the Arabian and Red Seas, the Obama administration
allowed the Saudis and other Gulf Arab states to purchase sophisticated military hardware and assisted the
Saudis in their campaign against the Houthi rebels in
Yemen (who follow a Shia sect of Islam) by providing
air fueling, logistics, and intelligence. Now, under the
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current Donald Trump administration, nuance in the
dispute between Saudi Arabia and Iran has been set
aside in favor of wholeheartedly backing Riyadh and
isolating Iran.
Although in the short run it may make sense for
the United States to side with Saudi Arabia in its conflict with Iran, U.S. policymakers need to think about
the long-term consequences of such a policy. First, the
high number of civilian casualties caused by errant
Saudi air strikes in Yemen has tarnished the U.S. image
in that country because of Washington’s military assistance to Riyadh. Second, with the United States giving
uncritical support to Saudi Arabia at a time when its
high-ranking officials are denigrating the Shia faith
gives the impression that the United States is taking
sides in a religious dispute. Not only does this fly in
the face of traditional U.S. foreign policy—which
has avoided taking part in religious wars—it has the
potential to jeopardize U.S. relations with friendly
leaders of Shia background, like Iraqi Prime Minister
Haider al-Abadi, who has been a key ally in the fight
against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Moreover, by siding with Sunni states like Saudi Arabia and
Bahrain, (both of which have a history of problematic
treatment of their Shia citizens) while only focusing
on Iran’s ill-treatment of its citizens, the United States
runs the risk of alienating the Shia in the region and
making a mockery of its human rights policy. Finally,
the perception of the United States siding with Sunnis
over Shia also runs the risk of alienating the younger
generation of Iranians who not only want better relations with the United States but who are also prideful of their Persian culture and Shia identity. Keeping
these young Iranians favorably disposed to the United
States should be a long-term goal of U.S. policymakers.
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The monograph recommends that U.S. policymakers should try to end the proxy wars in the region, like
those in Syria and Yemen, as a first step in easing the
Saudi-Iranian conflict and find areas where the United
States and Iran can find common ground. It also recommends the fostering of a dialogue between Saudi Arabia
(with other Gulf Cooperation Council states) and Iran
where objectionable behavior on both sides could be
aired and dealt with in a meaningful way. Although
it is highly unlikely that Iran would give up its ballistic missile program, it could be persuaded to cease its
subversive activities if the Gulf Arab states provided
that the Shia in these states are treated better. The fact
that the 2017 hajj (pilgrimage) to Mecca occurred without any major incident between Iran and Saudi Arabia
suggests that cooperation is possible. To reassure the
Saudis that an easing of U.S. tensions with Iran would
not make it vulnerable to a possible resurgence of Iranian aggression, the monograph recommends more
joint military exercises between the United States and
Saudi Arabia militaries as well as the deployment of
U.S. Army’s Stability Force Assistance Brigades to the
Saudi kingdom for training and defensive purposes.
In this way, the United States can preserve its equities
in Saudi Arabia while developing some links to Iran
that could be used to bolster relations with Tehran if
the regime were to moderate in the future. In the long
term, having friendly relations with both Saudi Arabia
and Iran and having both countries play a responsible
role in the Gulf, similar to that which they did in the
1970s prior to the Iranian revolution of 1979, would be
in the security interests of the United States.
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MANEUVERING THE SAUDI-IRANIAN
RIVALRY IN THE MIDDLE EAST:
HOW THE UNITED STATES CAN PRESERVE
AND PROTECT ITS LONG-TERM INTERESTS
IN THE REGION
INTRODUCTION
Iran and Saudi Arabia are going through one of
their worst periods since the 1979 Islamic revolution
in Iran. Both countries have not only traded diatribes
about trying to destabilize the other but are engaged
in costly and deadly proxy wars in various parts of the
Middle East. The situation between them is unlikely to
improve over the immediate short term, as conflicts in
which the proxy wars are taking place, such as Syria
and Yemen, are continuing to rage, but engaging both
countries in possible negotiations over regional issues
may be a way forward.
Because U.S. relations with Iran have been very
problematic since 1979, with still no formal diplomatic ties and U.S. opposition to many Iranian policies, Washington has sided with Saudi Arabia in this
conflict. Moreover, U.S.-Saudi relations, while going
through occasional strains, have been generally strong
since the late 1930s when U.S. companies discovered
oil in the kingdom and U.S. strategic planners in subsequent years saw the defense of Saudi Arabia as important for U.S. national security interests.
President Barack Obama, during the time of the
negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program, hoped that
the nuclear deal of 2015 would bring Iran out of isolation and back into the family of nations, thereby leading to a moderation of Iran’s behavior in the region. He
even stated in an interview that Iran and Saudi Arabia
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needed to learn to “share the neighborhood,”1 a comment that did not go down well in Riyadh. But this
moderation did not take place, in large part because
of the power structure of Iran, in which the hardline
Supreme Leader and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps (IRGC) have predominated. They want to keep
Iran, for ideological, political, and economic reasons,
as a “revolutionary” state and oppose any opening to
the United States.
President Donald Trump, by contrast, has avoided
the use of nuance, has openly sided with Saudi Arabia
in its conflict with Iran, and has suggested a tougher
policy toward Tehran despite having certified twice to
Congress (since the writing of this monograph in September 2017) that Iran has been in compliance with the
terms of the nuclear deal signed in 2015. During his
May 2017 trip to Riyadh, he singled out Iran for special
criticism in a major public speech.2 Some analysts have
suggested that U.S. policy under the Trump administration is geared toward embracing Sunni Muslim
Arab states not only to check Iran’s ambitions in the
region, but also to weaken Shia elements in the Arab
world that have sided with Iran.
While this approach may make sense strategically
because it is working to isolate an anti-U.S. regime
(Iran), it potentially has downsides in that it has tended
to support a more aggressive Saudi foreign and security policy in a region that may have long-term consequences that are not in U.S. national security interests.
Moreover, there is a sectarian dimension to this
Saudi-Iran conflict that may also rebound against the
United States. As many observers have noted, current
Sunni-Shia rivalries and conflicts have been the most
severe in decades, if not centuries. For the United States
to side with the Sunnis against the Shias not only goes
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against the traditions of U.S. foreign policy that have
avoided religious wars, but it also places the United
States in a dubious position because some Shia, like
the Prime Minister of Iraq, Haider al-Abadi, are U.S.
allies, and in other places, like in Bahrain, the Shia are
a repressed group that are looking to the United States
to support a non-sectarian human rights policy. How
the United States maneuvers this Iranian-Saudi rivalry
while it protects its long-term interests in the region is
the subject of this monograph.
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF CURRENT
IRANIAN-SAUDI RELATIONS
Prior to the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979, Iran
and Saudi Arabia were rivals in the Persian Gulf region
but occasionally cooperated with each other and were
certainly not enemies. Both were pro-Western monarchies that saw communism as their chief enemy,
and sought and received protection from the United
States during the Cold War. Both were also major oilproducing states, and its production and unhindered
flow out of the Persian Gulf was a key strategic objective of the United States and the Western alliance.
The United States deepened its relations with both
Iran and Saudi Arabia during and after World War II.
After American oil companies discovered oil in the
Saudi kingdom in 1938, the protection of this resource
became a strategic imperative, and the United States
built the Dhahran air base close to the Saudi oil fields
for this very purpose during the war. Because substantial oil revenues were not realized by Saudi Arabia
until the late 1940s, the United States even extended
lend-lease aid to that country during the war. The alliance was solidified during a meeting between U.S.
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President Franklin Roosevelt and Saudi King Ibn Saud
Abdul Aziz aboard a U.S. naval ship in the Suez Canal
in February 1945.3
As for Iran, the United States sent 30,000 troops to
that country during World War II, joining the British
and the Soviets in a massive transportation operation
to provide the Soviet Union with armaments, vehicles,
food, clothing, and other material to help it fight Nazi
Germany. After the war, the United States withdrew
its troops per an Allied agreement with the Iranian
Government but the Iranians looked to, and received
support from, the United States to pressure the Soviets to withdraw from northern Iran (they had initially
refused to leave as required) and support the Iranian
Government’s efforts to put down separatist republics in the northwestern part of the country that were
established with some Soviet help. Nationalist-minded
Iranians thus saw the United States as a protector of
their country’s independence and sovereignty.4
As is well known, U.S. involvement in Iran further
deepened to the point of intervening directly in Iranian politics on the side of the Shah against his prime
minister, Mohammad Mossadeq, in 1953 through a
clandestine operation run by the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) and British intelligence that helped to
overthrow Mossadeq. From that point onward, the
Shah was indebted to the United States and squarely
placed Iran on the side of the United States during
the Cold War (though this intervention came back to
haunt the United States from 1978 to 1979 when Iranian revolutionaries opposed Tehran’s close relations
with Washington). After the U.S.-planned coup against
Mossadeq succeeded, the United States provided Iran
with nearly US$1 billion in military and economic aid
between 1953 and 1963.5
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The United States established training missions
with the Iranian and Saudi Arabian militaries during
this period. The United States also sold both countries
arms, and Iranian and Saudi Arabian officers came to
the United States for advanced training at operational
bases, as well as in professional military educational
schools.
The Shah also developed a relationship with Israel,
allowing an Israeli interest section office to be opened
in Tehran and Iranian oil to be sold to Israel as well
as an intelligence liaison relationship to be established
between Iran’s SAVAK (Organization of National
Security and Information) and Israel’s Mossad.6
Although the Shah tried to keep these relations lowkey because of Muslim sensibilities, they were known
to Arab countries, like Saudi Arabia, who saw them as
strengthening Israel against the Arab states, and was a
source of friction between Tehran and Riyadh.
Another point of friction was the security vacuum
in the Persian Gulf when the British announced in
1968 that they would be leaving the region militarily
by 1971. Up until that point, the British were the dominant power in the Gulf, with protectorates over Bahrain, the Trucial States (which later became the United
Arab Emirates), and Qatar, as well as naval and air
bases in these states. From the U.S. perspective, this
British military role helped to protect the free flow of
oil from the Persian Gulf to the West.
While the United States initially worried about
this withdrawal, in large part because it was heavily
committed in Vietnam at this time and could not spare
extra troops and sailors to replace the British role there,
the Shah of Iran saw this withdrawal as an opportunity
to extend Iranian influence in the Gulf. He first resurrected the Iranian claim to Bahrain, which was once
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part of the Persian Empire and had many inhabitants
of Iranian descent. This claim caused a crisis not only
with Al Khalifa, the Arab tribal rulers of Bahrain, but
with the Saudis next door, who saw the Shah’s claim
as an encroachment on Arab sovereignty. The Shah
eventually relented on this claim in early 1970 when
the United Nations (UN) ascertained that the majority
of Bahrainis were opposed to union with Iran.7 Bahrain
became independent in August 1971.
However, the day before the British withdrawal
from the Trucial States, the Shah sent forces to take over
three small islands belonging to two of these states,
Ras Al-Khaimah and Sharjah, on November 30, 1971.
This event caused widespread anger, first at the British
for letting this happen, and then at Iran for this land
grab. Not only did the Shah not give these islands back
to the successor state, the United Arab Emirates, but
also, the islands have stayed in Iranian hands under
the Islamic Republic of Iran and remain one of many
irritants that the United Arab Emirates has with Iran.8
Despite Saudi misgivings about Iran’s role in the
Gulf, the United States decided to have the security
vacuum in the Gulf filled by both Iran and Saudi Arabia
as part of its “twin pillar” strategy in 1971. Of the two
countries, Iran was always the bigger pillar because
of its larger population and more competent military.
Iran showed its usefulness to the West by sending
troops to Oman in the mid-1970s to help put down the
Marxist-led Dhofar rebellion in the southwestern part
of that country in conjunction with British Special Air
Service troops.9
The rise in the price of oil from 1971 to 1974 further
fed the Shah’s appetite for regional power, helped by
the fact that the Richard Nixon administration allowed
the Shah to purchase highly advanced military
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hardware short of nuclear weapons. The Shah even
proclaimed he wanted Iran to be the world’s fifth largest military power. He was the one who began Iran’s
nuclear program, and there were suspicions that his
aim was to develop nuclear weapons, not just nuclear
power for energy needs.10 Although the Shah did not
pursue an anti-Saudi policy during this period, Arab
states like Saudi Arabia were worried that he wanted
to create a new Persian Empire at their expense.
The fall of the Shah, however, led the Saudis to
worry much more about Iran. Iran’s new ruler, Ayatollah Khomeini, criticized the Saudi ruling family and
proclaimed that monarchy was “incompatible with
Islam.”11 He also questioned their legitimacy to be the
custodians of Islam’s two holiest places, Mecca and
Medina. This radical, pan-Islamic message was coupled by Iran’s additional interest in the plight of the
Shia in Sunni Muslim countries like Saudi Arabia and
Bahrain. The Shia in Saudi Arabia account for about
10 percent of the population but are concentrated in
the strategic oil-rich Eastern Province. They have long
been treated as second-class citizens, and some Wahhabi clerics (Wahhabism is the doctrine practiced by
the Sunni majority in Saudi Arabia, though the Saudis
themselves prefer the term Salafis) have even declared
the Shia as heretics. The success of the Iranian revolution, Khomeini’s charisma, and the yearning for more
equal rights led some Shia of the Eastern Province to
see Khomeini as their hero and agitate on his behalf.
Clashes between the Shia and the Saudi security forces
occurred in this province from 1979 to 1980, with
Riyadh blaming Iran for stoking tensions and sending
agents to stir up the Shia.12 For the first time in generations, the sectarian issue—Sunni versus Shia—became
a major source of division in the region.
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The advent of the Iran-Iraq war in September 1980
also proved to be a source of friction between Iran and
Saudi Arabia. Although the Saudis had no love for
Iraq’s Baathist leader, Saddam Hussein, whose past
revolutionary Arab socialist rhetoric was a threat to
the Saudi kingdom, the Saudis saw him as the lesser of
two evils and helped to bankroll Iraq’s war effort, especially as Iraq’s oil revenues became depleted because
of high war costs. However, as the war dragged on,
it became apparent that Iraqi hopes for a victory were
illusionary. Much of the war, in fact, became a defensive one for Iraq, as the Khomeini regime was able to
rally the Iranian people by tapping nationalist sentiment against Iraq in addition to portraying the war
as a fight to “protect Islam” against Saddam Hussein
who was “fighting to destroy Islam.”13 For the Saudis
and many other Gulf Arab states that aided Iraq, the
idea of Iran capturing southern Iraq and then turning
southward into their own countries was a terrifying
prospect.
The Gulf Arab states, under Saudi leadership,
created the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 1980
partly for this reason.14 Although the GCC was also
designed to facilitate political, economic, and military
cooperation among its member states (Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar,
and Oman), it has had a checkered history. The recent
controversy over Qatar and its policies, which has led
Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates
to cut diplomatic relations with it, has underscored its
fragility.
The last years of the Iran-Iraq war also proved difficult for Saudi-Iranian relations, as the so-called tanker
war in which both Iran and Iraq tried to hit oil ships
aiding the other, took place. The fact that the United
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States came to the aid of the Saudis and the other GCC
members during this phase became another sore point
in relations between Tehran and Riyadh.
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, which led
to the introduction of about 500,000 U.S. troops into
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf region to protect the Saudi
kingdom and eventually remove Iraqi troops from
Kuwait in early 1991, had profound consequences for
Saudi Arabia and Iran. First, it showed that the Saudis,
despite the billions spent on their defense, could not
protect themselves from a possible Iraqi invasion of
their own territory without help from the United States,
and after Iraqi forces were expelled from Kuwait, it led
to Iraq being weakened and under strict UN sanctions.
After a costly 8-year war with Iraq, the Iranians were
pleased that its nemesis next door (Iraq) was boxed in,
but were concerned that the U.S. presence in the Gulf
was enhanced. For example, after Operation DESERT
STORM, there were at least 5,000 U.S. troops stationed
in Kuwait throughout the 1990s, the U.S. naval base
in Bahrain was expanded, and the U.S. Navy’s presence in the Gulf was elevated to Fleet status in 1995.
Qatar allowed for the prepositioning of U.S. military
equipment and the building of a U.S. military base in
Al Udeid near Doha, and the United Arab Emirates
allowed the U.S. military access to its army bases and
naval ports. Although Saudi Arabia did not sign a
formal security agreement with the United States after
the Gulf war, it allowed thousands of U.S. military personnel to be stationed at Saudi air bases to enforce the
no-fly zone over southern Iraq.15
In the 1990s, under Iranian Presidents Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami, Iran pursued a rapprochement with Saudi Arabia. It refrained
from using revolutionary discourse, stopped its
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propaganda attacks on Saudi Arabia and other Gulf
Arab monarchies, reportedly ended covert support for
violent opposition groups in the Gulf region as well as
overseas assassination teams, and pursued fewer challenges to maritime traffic in the Gulf. For its part, Saudi
Arabia saw Iran as less of a threat because Saddam
was still in power in Iraq, and was impressed with
Iran’s desire to ease tensions with the Gulf Arab states.
Then-Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah even attended an
Islamic Organization Conference summit in Tehran in
1997 where he used the opportunity to meet with Khatami and Supreme Leader Khamenei. On the negative
side, there was the Khobar Towers (a housing complex that was populated by U.S. military personnel)
attack during this period that was later attributed to an
Iran-supported group. On the economic side, when oil
prices fell significantly at the end of the 1990s, Saudi
Arabia was upset that Iran was not sticking to its Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries quota on
production, which helped to keep the oil market oversupplied and prices low.16
DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 2003
The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, however, led
to a situation of the Saudis becoming alarmed again
by Iranian ambitions. The removal of Saddam and his
regime from power allowed the Iraqi Shia to come
to power, some of which, like those connected to the
Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq,
had very close ties to Iran. In the insecurity that ensued
after the fall of the Baathist regime, Iran took advantage of the situation by working closely with, and providing military assistance to, various Shia groups not
only to help them defend against Sunni insurgents
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who targeted the Shia, but to battle against U.S. and
allied forces.17
In Saudi eyes, Iraq was turning into an Iranian
vassal state. Thus for many years, Riyadh refused to
send an ambassador to Baghdad, believing that the
new Iraqi regime was not representative of the Iraqi
people because it failed to reach an accommodation with the Sunnis and was under strong Iranian
influence. Moreover, Iran’s new President, Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad (2005 to 2013), backed by Supreme Leader
Ayatollah Khamenei, seemed to put Iran back on
the radical path of the Khomeini era, even though
Ahmadinejad paid a visit to Saudi Arabia during his
presidency. Ahmadinejad seemed determined to press
ahead with Iran’s nuclear program that the Saudis saw
as a direct threat.18
The advent of the so-called Arab Spring uprising
also increased tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia.
Concerning Bahrain, which is ruled by an Arab Sunni
royal family but whose majority of inhabitants are Shia
and have long been repressed, the demonstrations in
February 2011 for more political rights increasingly
came to be seen by the Bahraini royals and the Sunni
minority on the island as a Shia uprising. The Saudis and
Emiratis sent troops into Bahrain in mid-March 2011 to
guard the financial district of the island to enable the
Bahraini authorities to put down these demonstrations
by force.19 The Bahraini authorities, plus the Saudis
and Emiratis, saw an Iranian hand in these protests,
even though the Shia of Bahrain had (and still have)
legitimate grievances about discrimination and gerrymandering of electoral districts for parliament that
favor the Sunnis without any need for Iran to provoke
them. Predictably, though, Iran denounced the use of
force against the Bahraini Shia protestors, as well as
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the arrests of Shia demonstrators and activists in Saudi
Arabia’s Eastern Province. As repression continued
in Bahrain against Shia political parties and activists,
some radical elements of Bahrain’s Shia community
have indeed sought some clandestine assistance from
Iran (which the Bahraini authorities are only too eager
to publicize),20 and so the Bahraini and Saudi charge
of Iranian collusion with the Shia has become a partial
self-fulfilling prophecy.
Although some scholars and analysts see the IranSaudi antagonisms in the Gulf as well as the broader
Middle East as more of a traditional power rivalry
between two large states for regional hegemony (for
example, former acting director of the CIA Mike Morell
has claimed that Iran wants to recreate the former Persian Empire),21 it would be wrong to diminish the sectarian aspect of this struggle. For example, sectarianism
allows Iran to extend its influence in Iraq. Without this
connection between Iran (a mostly Shia state) and the
Shia of Iraq (now in the seat of power), it would be
very difficult to have a close relationship between Iran
and Iraq, as previous regimes in both countries usually played on historic animosities between Arabs and
Persians.
Second, without the importance of sectarianism,
Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Kuwait would not be as
worried about Iran as they are now. True, Iranian
attempts at hegemony in the Gulf region would be
seen as dangerous by these countries regardless of sectarianism, but sectarianism exacerbates these tensions
by playing into fears of internal strife and subversion
within these countries. Both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait
have significant Shia minorities, while Bahrain has a
Shia majority. All of these countries are fearful about
their Shia communities being inflamed by Iran even

12

though they do not want to admit their own policy failures of not fully integrating the Shia into their societies. (Kuwait, however, has a better track record on this
issue than the other two countries.)22
Third, the leaders of Saudi Arabia and Iran have
also used sectarianism to explain why they have such
problems with the other. For example, in early May
2017, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman
gave an extensive interview within which he denigrated the Shia belief of the Mahdi returning one day
that purportedly necessitated Iran’s need to “take
over the entire Islamic world.” The Crown Prince then
asked rhetorically, “Where are the common points that
we might be able to reach an understanding?”23
For their part, Iranian leaders have denounced
the Wahhabi doctrine and claimed it is the root of the
extremism Muslims are witnessing in the Middle East
and Europe. In an opinion piece in The New York Times
in September 2016, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Sharif charged that, over the past 3 decades,
Riyadh has spent billions of dollars “exporting Wahhabism through thousands of mosques and madrasas
across the world” and underscoring that this “theological perversion has wrought havoc” throughout the
globe. This Wahhabi “doctrine of hate,” in his view,
has not only targeted minority groups and Shiites but
“has inspired virtually every terrorist group abusing
the name of Islam.”24
In the wake of the terrorist attack on the London
bridge near the British Parliament in early June 2017,
the Iranian Foreign Ministry issued a statement that
Europe needed to go after the “main financial and
ideological sources” of such violence, “which are clear
to everyone,” a thinly-veiled reference to Saudi Arabia.
Part of Iran’s focus on Wahhabism and its alleged links
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to terrorism is to deflect Western charges that Tehran
supports terrorist groups, but the sectarian motive
cannot be underestimated.25
On Syria, Iran and Saudi Arabia have played opposite roles in comparison to the Bahrain conflict. Iran has
come to the aid of the minority Assad regime because
of sectarian and strategic ties (the Syrian regime is
ruled chiefly by Alawites—a sectarian group that is an
offshoot of Shia Islam, and Syria has long facilitated
Iran’s entry into the Levant region, particularly its
assistance to Hezbollah of Lebanon). Iran and Saudi
Arabia have provided Syria with arms and IRGC operatives and fighters, while the Saudis have backed and
continue to back some Sunni rebel groups seeking
Assad’s ouster.26 Like the situation in Iraq, the Saudis
see Iran playing a prominent and dangerous role in
Syria, a country in the Arab heartland. From Iran’s perspective, Saudi Arabia has enabled the “covert flow of
petrodollars to extremist groups in Syria” under the
false guise that such groups are “moderate.” Many
observers see Syria, therefore, as a battleground for
Iranian and Saudi proxies.
On Yemen, the Saudis and the Iranians are also
engaged in a proxy war. The Houthi movement from
the north of Yemen is made up of followers of the Zaydi
branch of Shia Islam. They have occasionally battled
the central government of Yemen for more rights over
many years. However, in the chaos that resulted from
Yemen’s Arab Spring uprising in 2011 to 2012, the
Houthis were unhappy with the new Sunni regime of
Abdrabbu Mansour Hadi, and in the autumn of 2014
moved south to take over the capital of Sana’a, aided
by forces loyal to the deposed Yemeni President, Ali
Abdallah Saleh. The extent of Iranian military support for the Houthis is the subject of some debate. The
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Houthis were probably able to obtain substantial arms
from Yemen’s military stocks while purchasing others
on the black market, but it appears that since 2011 they
have also received some arms from Iran.27 From the
Saudi perspective, Iran’s relations with the Houthis
are a way for Tehran to cause havoc and instability
in their backyard. Hence, in 2015, the Saudis, under
the leadership of Defense Minister (and now Crown
Prince) Mohammad bin Salman, came to the aid of the
beleaguered Yemeni Government (which had escaped
to the southern Yemeni port city of Aden), and began a
military campaign against the Houthis, dubbed Operation DECISIVE STORM.28
The Saudis were able to persuade a number of
Sunni Arab governments to join their military coalition against the Houthis, though it appears that Saudi
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are the primary
belligerents in this war on the side of the Hadi government and have done so mostly from the air (though the
United Arab Emirates has sent some ground forces to
Yemen, and there have been some clashes between the
Saudi Army and the Houthis along Yemen’s northern
border). Saudi actions in the Yemen conflict seem to be
part of a more aggressive Saudi regional stance over
the past few years under King Salman (who ascended
to the throne in early 2015) and his son, Crown Prince
Mohammad Bin Salman.29
In the midst of these proxy wars has been the controversy over the Iran nuclear deal, officially called the
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, signed between
Tehran and the P5+1 countries (China, France, Russia,
the United Kingdom, and the United States―the five
permanent members of the UN Security Council―plus
Germany) in July 2015. Although Saudi Arabia officially endorsed the deal, it was quite unhappy with
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its outcome, believing that Iran would still try to hide
some of its nuclear programs, be in a position 10 years
later to restart the entire program, and, with a windfall of cash from the lifting of international sanctions,
be more inclined to engage in destabilizing activities in the Arab world.30 Ironically, Saudi Arabia and
Israel, despite their long-standing differences over
the Arab-Israeli conflict, were on the same page with
regard to the opposition to the Iran nuclear deal. The
joke in Washington in 2015 was that the Saudis did
not believe they needed to lobby hard against this deal
knowing that the Israelis would be doing the job for
them.31 In the end, however, the U.S. Congress did not
have enough votes to block the deal that the Obama
administration helped to negotiate, and it went into
effect.
What caused a break in Saudi-Iranian relations was
not the nuclear deal per se (though that certainly contributed to the tensions), but the ramifications of the
Saudi execution in early January 2016 of prominent
Saudi Shia cleric Nimr al-Nimr, who hailed from the
troubled Eastern Province and who had called for the
overthrow of the Saudi monarchy. Although the Saudi
Government considered him a terrorist, and he was
executed along with many Sunni terrorists that same
day, Iran and many Shia communities in the Arab
world reacted angrily and, in some cases, violently to
his execution. Iran emphasized that Nimr had studied theology in the Iranian holy city of Qom and was
a learned cleric of stature who was unfairly charged
and executed by the Saudi regime. A mob in Tehran
burned down the Saudi Embassy, and the Iranian
police did not do anything to stop them.32 This incident
caused Saudi Arabia, along with Bahrain, the United
Arab Emirates, and Qatar (out of solidarity), to break
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off diplomatic relations with Tehran, a break that continues to this day (except for Qatar which restored
them in August 2017 after encountering its own problems with the Saudi-led group).33 This entire episode
involving the execution of Nimr and its fallout was
symptomatic of the sharp Sunni-Shia divisions that
have plagued the region in recent years. Although the
reaction to the execution was the most violent in Iran,
there were also demonstrations against Saudi Arabia
among the Shia of Iraq, Bahrain, and Lebanon.
This conflict also had a spillover effect on the hajj,
the annual Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca, and which has
also been a contentious point between Saudi Arabia
and Iran over the years. In 2016, Iran “suspended” participation in the hajj because it could not reach an agreement with Saudi Arabia on the pilgrimage,34 a rather
dramatic development because participating in the hajj
is one of five pillars of Islam—a solemn requirement for
a Muslim (regardless of sect) to perform at least once
in one’s lifetime if one is physically and financially able
to do so. There were recriminations on both sides. The
Saudis said they wanted assurances of non-violence
by Iran. In 1987, Iranian pilgrims used the hajj, at the
encouragement of Ayatollah Khomeini, to chant antiU.S. slogans that the Saudis interpreted as an implicit
attack on them because of their close ties to Washington. Clashes ensued with Saudi security forces, leading
to 400 deaths and a break in Iranian-Saudi diplomatic
relations from 1987 to 1991. There have also been cases
in other years where many Iranian pilgrims have died
in stampedes during the hajj. In 2017, both countries,
despite being in diplomatic limbo because of the break
in relations mentioned earlier, sought to ease tensions
somewhat over the hajj. The Iranians have toned down
their anti-Saudi rhetoric somewhat, and the Saudis
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allowed visas for 86,000 Iranian citizens to perform
the hajj, perhaps because they did not want to be perceived as preventing Muslims from performing their
religious duties. Helping matters was that aides to
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei called on Iranian pilgrims to avoid provocations.35
BALANCING DIFFERENT INTERESTS UNDER
THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION
In 2009, the Obama administration initially hoped
for a new beginning with Iran but this effort was
thwarted by Iran’s efforts to ramp up its nuclear program. It then decided to enhance sanctions on Iran
with the support of the international community.
After several years being under these new sanctions
and seeing the determination of the international community on this issue, Iran returned to the negotiating
table. Although the deal that was ultimately reached
did allow Iran to maintain a nuclear program, albeit on
a much smaller scale, Iran’s ability to enrich uranium
would be set at a limit far below the level necessary
for the production of a nuclear bomb. Moreover, Iran
agreed to intrusive inspections by the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to ensure that it was
adhering to the deal and its limits on nuclear fuel production.36 Despite these restrictions, which the Obama
administration and the other P5+1 countries hailed
as a success, Saudi Arabia and some other Gulf Arab
countries still viewed the deal with grave concern. For
this reason, the Obama administration, in an effort to
assuage these concerns, promised the countries that
they would be able to purchase even more sophisticated military weapons from the United States, as a
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hedge against what they saw was an aggressive and
untamed Iran.37
In addition, when Saudi Arabia decided to intervene in the Yemen crisis in a major way in March of
2015 (a time when the parameters of the Iran nuclear
deal were becoming known), the United States felt
obliged to assist Riyadh in its air campaign with intelligence, logistics, and refueling capabilities.38 The United
States did not like the fact that Iran was giving some
assistance to the Houthis—and Secretary of State John
Kerry even took time out during the nuclear negotiations to criticize Iran’s attempt to send arms to the
Houthis.39 Washington’s primary concern in Yemen
was the ongoing chaos in that country which allowed
terrorist groups like al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(the most active of the al-Qaeda affiliates in planning
and carrying out anti-U.S. operations) and Islamic
State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) to take control of more
Yemeni territory.
While aiding the Saudis in their Yemen campaign,
the United States also tried to bring about a peace settlement between the Houthis and the Hadi government
with the aid of the Omanis. Despite such efforts, which
included direct involvement by Secretary of State John
Kerry, no agreement was reached.40
More ominous from the Obama administration’s
perspective was that the Yemeni campaign, especially the air war launched primarily by Saudi Arabia,
resulted in thousands of civilian casualties. There have
been many instances when Saudi military planes have
bombed hospitals, schools, and funerals.41 Although
the Saudis were initially in denial about causing
such large numbers of civilian casualties, they have
recently been more forthcoming about errant strikes.
For example, on August 27, 2017, a spokesman for the
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Saudi-led coalition against the Houthis stated that an
airstrike that killed 14 civilians earlier that month was
the result of a “technical mistake,” and emphasized
it was accidental and unintentional. The spokesman
expressed “sincere sympathy” for the deaths and said
the intended target was a legitimate Houthi military
installation in Sana’a.42
Despite such regrets, there is no hiding the fact
that such errant air strikes have been all too common
in the Yemeni campaign. Not only have human rights
organizations issued sharp criticisms of these strikes,
but the UN has denounced them as well, noting that
between March 2015 and January 2017, about 10,000
civilians have been killed and 40,000 have been
injured.43 Although the Houthis have also been responsible for some civilian casualties, much of the attention
has focused on the Saudi-led air war. The UN also has
warned about famine conditions in Yemen and in 2017
reported that hundreds of Yemenis have died from the
outbreak of cholera.44
Hence, U.S. officials came to see that their association with the air war, even if indirect, was becoming
a liability because the United States was increasingly
seen in Yemen as aiding the Saudi campaign. Criticism of this U.S. role was voiced among some members of the U.S. Congress as well.45 Consequently, the
administration began to distance itself from the Saudi
war effort. In the summer of 2016, the United States
reduced the number of U.S. personnel at a Joint Combined Planning Cell in Saudi Arabia that was helping
the Saudis coordinate the air campaign, and in October
2016, after a Saudi accidental bombing of a funeral in
Yemen, the spokesman for the White House’s National
Security Council said the United States was not giving
the Saudis a “blank check.”46 In late 2016, the United
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States also held up the delivery of precision-guided
munitions to the Saudis over concerns that the Royal
Saudi Air Force would not be able use them properly and would lead to even more civilian casualties.47
Prominent American newspapers also questioned
the efficacy of the United States taking the side of the
Saudis in the Yemen campaign.48
THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S ONE-SIDED
POLICIES ON THE IRAN-SAUDI CONFLICT
The Trump administration initially seemed to show
that it was not going to be hesitant about helping the
Saudis in their fight against so-called Iranian proxies
like in Yemen. In the spring of 2017, it lifted the hold
on the precision-guided weapons systems and promised a tougher stand against Iran. During a visit to
Saudi Arabia in the spring of 2017, Defense Secretary
James Mattis stated “Everywhere you look, if there is
trouble in the region, you find Iran.”49 This comment
was not just meant to please his Saudi hosts but was
something that Mattis genuinely believed, according
to press reports.
President Trump purposely made Saudi Arabia the
first country he visited overseas as President, a trip he
took in May 2017. He made a special point of meeting
not only with the Saudi king and other high-level Saudi
officials but also with an assembled group of leaders
from other Sunni Arab countries, including from all of
the GCC states. In a public address to this assembly,
he singled out Iran for special criticism. He said the
Iranian regime has given safe haven, financial backing,
and social standing to terrorists and was “responsible for so much instability in the region.” This regime,
he went on, also funds arms and trains terrorists and
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militias “from Lebanon to Iraq to Yemen.” He emphasized to the assembled Sunni leaders that Iran for
decades had “fueled the fires of sectarian conflict and
terror,” and urged his audience in Riyadh and the
international community as a whole to “isolate Iran,
deny it funding for terrorism, and pray for the day
when the Iranian people have the just and righteous
government they deserve.”50
Heading further into the sectarian divide in the
Middle East, without saying so explicitly, Trump also
met separately with the Bahraini King Sheikh Hamid
bin Issa al-Khalifa and acknowledged there had been
“a little strain” in the bilateral relationship, “but there
won’t be strain with this administration.”51 Trump was
referring not only to criticism of Bahrain by the Obama
administration over human rights issues, such as the
crackdown on Shia political activists and clerics, but
the hold up of F-16 aircraft to Bahrain over these issues.
On the Iranian nuclear issue, as of August 2017,
Trump has twice certified to Congress that Iran was
in compliance with the nuclear deal, but he has done
so reluctantly and only after his top foreign policy and
security aides, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and
Defense Secretary Mattis, told him that to not do so
when Iran was indeed fulfilling the terms of the deal
would lose the United States support in the international community, according to press reports.52 Nonetheless, Trump and some of his other aides, such as
his U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Nikki Haley, have
stated that Iran was in violation of the “spirit” of the
nuclear deal, citing in particular its testing of missiles.53
As of August 2017, Trump has suggested that the next
time he sends a report on the nuclear deal to Congress,
meaning in mid-October 2017, he might not certify that
Iran is in compliance.54 This comment prompted some
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Iranian officials to denounce the president’s intentions
and add, if the United States formally pulls out of the
agreement, Iran would pull out of it as well and vigorously restart its nuclear program.55
Trump’s views on Iran seem to conform to those of
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain.
The foreign minister of Bahrain told the press in April
2017 that Trump understood the threats to the U.S.
Gulf Arab allies better than his predecessor.56 Meanwhile, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman,
in an extensive television interview with MBC (an
Arabic language station) in early May 2017, said dialogue with Iran was “impossible” for theological reasons, claiming that Iran was planning for the “return
of the Imam Mahdi” whom the Shiites believe went
into hiding a thousand years ago and would return
to establish global Islamic rule before the end of the
world. He asked rhetorically, “How do you have a dialogue with a regime built on an extremist ideology?”
He charged that the Iranians believe they must control
the “land of the Muslims and spread their Twelver Jaafari [Shiite] sect in the Muslim world.” He also claimed
that the Iranians want to take over Mecca and warned,
“We will not wait until the fight is inside Saudi Arabia,
and we will work so that the battle is on their side,
inside Iran, not in Saudi Arabia.” Finally, he boasted
that the Saudi Army could easily defeat the Houthis
“in a matter of days” but had desisted from such a land
campaign because it would cause many casualties.57

23

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. NATIONAL
SECURITY POLICYMAKERS IN DEALING WITH
SUNNI-SHIA DIVISIONS
Desist from Anti-Shia Policies and Shore Up
Support for Iraqi Leader Haider al-Abadi
President Trump’s visit to Saudi Arabia gave the
impression in the region that the United States was
pursuing a strong anti-Iran policy not just for strategic
reasons, but also because of Iran’s Shia identity. While
a good argument can be made for trying to keep Iran
isolated because of its support for some terrorists in
the region, like the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hamas,
Hezbollah, and its support for proxies in several Arab
countries (and the hope for Iranian moderation that
former President Obama had been banking on, which
did not materialize), there is a long-term danger for the
United States to be seen as taking sides in a sectarian
conflict.
First, the United States, as a mostly secular country (at least one that has separated church from state),
has never entered into the fray of a religious war or
dispute. It has taken part in an ideological war or at
least framed it that way (World War I—a fight to make
the world safe for democracy; World War II—a fight
against fascism; the Cold War and the Vietnam war—a
fight against communism), but never a religious one.
Hence, it is not in the U.S. tradition to be part of a religious or sectarian conflict.
Second, as a practical matter, not all Shia are U.S.
enemies and not all Sunnis are U.S. friends. The United
States has close ties with the Shia-dominated Government of Iraq led by Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi,
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a key ally in the fight against ISIS. It does not make
sense to alienate him or his coalition partners, especially if the United States wants Iraq to stabilize, prosper, and be not so dependent on Iran in the coming
years. If the United States alienates a moderate Shia
leader like Abadi, Iran would be more than happy to
fill the vacuum and pursue an even more intrusive role
in Iraq by cultivating more Shia leaders.
To shore up Abadi’s position, the United States
should continue to train Iraq’s Army as that would
strengthen Abadi’s position in Iraq, help him reach
out to the Sunnis because the army also contains Sunni
elements, and eventually weaken the Popular Mobilization Forces, some of which are tied to Iran. The
United States should also support his position against
Iraqi Kurdish desires for independence (as it is doing
now)58 but should counsel him not to take military
action against the Kurds because not only would this
pit two U.S. allies against one another, but it could also
be an embarrassment for Abadi if the national army
does not perform well against the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga forces, which are loyal to the Kurdish Regional
Government.
Another way the United States can shore up Abadi
is to galvanize the international community (European
countries, Japan, the Gulf Arab states, and international financial institutions) to come up with a realistic
and solvent plan to help the Iraqi Government rebuild
the heavily damaged cities, which could cost tens of
billions of dollars. Since the United States lost at least
US$8 billion in Iraqi reconstruction funding because
of fraud, waste, and abuse in the 2003 to 2012 period,
according to U.S. auditors,59 it would not be realistic
politically for Washington to again commit billions of
dollars to a new Iraqi reconstruction program. Instead,
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the United States should take the lead in bringing the
international community together to help fund this
endeavor, which would spread the burden among
different countries and institutions. The Iraqi Government, because of relatively low oil revenues and
high governmental war costs against ISIS as well as
large expenditures for civil service salaries and social
welfare benefits, has been running budget deficits in
the US$20 billion range annually over the past several years.60 Hence, it cannot fund the reconstruction
of the damaged cities by itself. Unless these damaged
cities (which are mostly in the Sunni areas of Iraq) are
rebuilt, Abadi will have a difficult time reaching out
and accommodating the Sunnis, and he could face
another ISIS-like group taking advantage of Sunni dissatisfaction in the near future. Thus, by taking the lead
in organizing a major donor group to help rebuild Iraq,
the United States not only can demonstrate its support
for a moderate Shia leader like Abadi, but it can also
possibly preclude another Sunni extremist group from
forming in Iraq.
Speak Out More Forcefully on Repression of Shiites
in Bahrain
U.S. human rights policy should not be based
on sectarian criteria. If the Shia in Bahrain are being
repressed, turning a blind eye to their plight simply
because they are Shia and not Sunni makes a mockery
of U.S. human rights policy. To be effective, the United
States needs to be neutral on religious issues and needs
to condemn regimes that are putting down any group
regardless of religion or sect. It could be the Sunnis 1
day in one country and the Shia in another. What counts
is for the United States to stand up for the rights of any
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group, religious, secular, or otherwise, being repressed
simply for airing their grievances. President Trump’s
embrace of the Bahraini king and his public message
that there will not be tensions in the bilateral relationship under his administration unfortunately sent the
message to the Bahraini authorities that repression of
the Shia is not going to be opposed by Washington.61
This has likely caused other Shia in the region to take
notice about the United States taking a one-sided view
of human rights policy.
The United States Should Speak Out against Religious Intolerance
The United States should speak out more forcefully
against religious intolerance and emphasize that all
countries (not just Iran) must do a better job in having
their religious authorities preach tolerance and to be
careful about funding groups in the region that espouse
an extremist interpretation of Islam. Trump did attempt
to do this in his May 2017 speech in Riyadh, but this
message was overshadowed by his own specific criticism of Iran. In other words, by signaling out Iran
and not taking other countries, especially Sunni countries like Saudi Arabia, to task about intolerance and
support for extremist groups, the message becomes
a sectarian one regardless of the original intent. For
example, Saudi Arabia’s own religious ideology, Wahhabism, has helped to radicalize many Muslim youth.
Some Saudi clerics who espouse this ideology have
been known to preach intolerance of other religions,
including those of the “Peoples of the Book” (i.e.,
Christians and Jews). They also believe that Islamic
texts should be protected against Muslim minority
sects like Shiaism. Many Saudi youth, inculcated in
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Wahhabi ideology, went to Iraq during the 2003 to 2008
period to fight for al-Qaeda in Iraq against the Shia and
U.S. forces, and a later group went to fight for ISIS in
both Syria and Iraq.62 Although it is unlikely that the
young Saudis who went to fight in these conflicts on
the side of the terrorists did so with the approval of
the Saudi political authorities, some radical clerics in
the Saudi kingdom may have influenced them to join
such groups. Hence, Saudi Arabia is not innocent in
realm of espousing an extremist religious ideology. If
U.S. policymakers are going to make a major speech on
religious tolerance, they should either refrain from signaling out Iran or make sure that if Iran is mentioned,
Sunni countries are also mentioned. However, since
mentioning the latter would cause strains with U.S.
allies, a speech without mentioning any specific country would be preferable.
The United States Should Be Sensitive to Views of
Iran’s Younger Generation, Likely the Next Leaders
of Their Country
The United States should be more sensitive to the
views of Iran’s younger generation who are likely to
be leaders of their country in the coming years. While
there are good reasons for the United States to oppose
certain Iranian activities in the region, the United
States must be careful to not be perceived as siding
with Sunnis against Shia or to be seen as taking an antiShia attitude because to do so would likely alienate this
important demographic. Most Iranians are very proud
of their identity that includes a mix of being part of an
ancient Persian civilization and followers of Shia Islam.
Even for young middle class Iranians, who may not
be very religious, they would see an attack on Shiaism
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as an attack on their own culture, and when Shia in
the other parts of the world are being repressed―be it
in the Arab countries, Afghanistan, or Pakistan―they
take notice. It is not in the long-term interests, then,
of the United States to alienate Iran’s future generation that, from all accounts, wants better relations with
the United States and the West in general. Scenes of
young Iranians celebrating and dancing in the streets
of Tehran when the nuclear deal with the P5+1 countries was signed in 2015 is indicative of this yearning.63 Although Trump, in his speech in Riyadh in May
2017, mentioned the fact that Iran has “a rich history
and culture,” he also stated that Iran has “fueled sectarian conflict,”64 implying this was a one-way street.
Although it would not have been politically prudent
for Trump in Riyadh to say publicly that this sectarian conflict is the result of both Iran and Saudi Arabia
pursuing it, the omission of any mention of the Saudis
in this conflict was undoubtedly interpreted in Iran as
the United States taking sides in a sectarian dispute.
Trump’s warm meeting with Bahraini king during this
same visit was also probably taken that way.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S.
POLICYMAKERS ON DEALING WITH IRAN
AND SAUDI ARABIA
Separating the Nuclear Deal from Iran’s Regional
Activities
It behooves U.S. policymakers to parse out the
nuclear deal from other aspects of Iranian behavior. As
long as Iran is adhering to the nuclear deal and not violating any of its components (such as limiting uranium
enrichment to a low level and allowing IAEA inspectors
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to monitor Iranian facilities), the U.S. administration should continue to certify to Congress (a process
required by law) that Iran is complying with the agreement. To do otherwise might set in motion a series of
events that could result in a major military conflict. For
example, if the United States decides to pull out of the
nuclear agreement, Iran might feel compelled to pull
out of it as well and restart a major nuclear program.
If that happens, Israel might decide to attack Iran’s
nuclear facilities, prompting Iran to retaliate by using
groups under its influence like Hezbollah and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Even Hamas, which has distanced
itself from Iran in recent years because of Tehran’s
support for the Assad government in the Syrian civil
war but has now been seeking a rapprochement with
Iran,65 might join the fight as well. Having the ArabIsraeli situation erupt into a major violent conflagration
would destabilize the Middle East even more than it is
now. If the U.S. administration believes U.S. strikes on
Iran (a result of Iran restarting its nuclear program in a
major way) were going to lead to an upheaval in Iran
that would cause a change of regime, they are likely to
be disappointed. Under that scenario, Iranians of most
political persuasions would likely rally around the flag
and support the regime against “the aggressor” as they
would term it.
Moreover, for the United States to pull out of the
nuclear agreement when Iran is technically in compliance would not be supported by U.S. allies in Europe.
These allies do not want a war scenario to become a
reality and are interested in doing business with Iran.
They would see the United States as both contributing
to a war and hurting their own economies by creating
conditions in which their own companies would not
be safe investing or doing business with Iran.
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Furthermore, pulling out of the Iran nuclear deal
when Iran remains in compliance would set a very
bad precedent for any other country that develops a
nuclear program and comes to an agreement with the
international community to limit it. Such countries
might not trust the United States to stick to its part of
the bargain if the United States uses the excuse of a
particular country not adhering to the “spirit” of the
agreement, whatever that might mean.
Finally, U.S. officials need to understand that, even
though Supreme Leader Khamenei gave President
Hassan Rouhani and Foreign Minister Mohammad
Javad Zarif the green light to negotiate with the P5+1
countries, the deal would not have been concluded
if there were a different Iranian negotiating team in
place. Rouhani and Zarif, while part of the regime,
are much more willing to deal with the West than the
regime hardliners. Although it is true that Khamenei is
the ultimate decision-maker, when it became apparent
that the Iranian public overwhelmingly supported the
deal and to renege on it would likely cause political
problems at home for the regime, Khamenei put aside
his own misgivings about it,66 and the hardline IRGC
had to fall in line. For the United States to pull out of
the deal would likely deal a blow to the moderates and
give the hardliners even more power than they have
now, and that would not be in the U.S. interest.
Some U.S. officials and think tank analysts, past and
present, have argued that there is no real difference
between the so-called moderates and the hardliners
in Iran,67 and note that, in any case, the IRGC, especially its elite intelligence Quds force, which aids terrorist groups in the region and supports Shia militias
in Iraq and Syria, is only answerable to the Supreme
Leader and not the President. While the latter part of
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this argument is true, for the United States to pursue
policies that would weaken the moderates eliminates
potential and reasonable interlocutors that the United
States would have with Iran not just on the nuclear
issue, but on other issues that may arise in the future. It
should be remembered that, although the United States
and Iran have had bad relations since 1979, historically, the two countries have had good relations that
went beyond U.S. support for the last Shah. Tens of
thousands of Iranians studied in the United States and,
as mentioned earlier, the young generation, which has
only known the present regime, yearns for better relations with the United States and the West. Keeping a
line open to Iran, even at a time when the United States
has strong differences with the regime over its regional
policies, will serve as an insurance policy for the future
in the event that Iran does indeed have a truly moderate regime one day, not just a moderate presidency
and foreign ministry.
Tone Down the Rhetoric over the Iranian
Missile Threat
There has been much U.S. attention on Iran’s development and testing of missiles, and the Trump administration and many members of Congress have strongly
objected to this type of activity.68 Trump himself might
use Iran’s ongoing missile program, even though it
was not explicitly part of the nuclear deal, to argue that
Iran is not in compliance with the “spirit” of the deal.
However, U.S. anxieties about these missiles should
be placed in context. As long as these missiles are not
equipped with a nuclear warhead (which would be a
violation of the nuclear deal in any case), they are not a
real threat to Iran’s neighbors. If Iran would ever fire a
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missile toward Israel or Saudi Arabia, these two countries, backed by the United States, could easily retaliate against Iran with their own conventional weapons,
although the Israelis would probably be able to do
much more damage to Iran than the Saudis despite
the fact that the latter is closer geographically to Iran
than the former. If the United States has not done so
already, it should quietly inform the Iranians that any
missile strike against a U.S. ally in the region would
invite not only counterstrikes by these two countries
but a possible strike by the United States as well. The
situation would change dramatically if Iran were to
ever to develop and put a nuclear warhead on one of
these missiles—and certainly Israel would see such a
development as an existential threat and act accordingly—but the Iranians are not so foolish as to go down
this road knowing the potential of Israel’s capabilities.
U.S. efforts to compel Iran to dismantle its missiles
are not likely to work. It should be remembered that
Iran was subjected to many missile strikes from Iraq
during the Iran-Iraq war, including attacks on Tehran.69 Iran believes that missiles are vital for its defense
and are a source of national pride. Such missile tests
look impressive on Iranian television sets and are a
warning to its adversaries, but without a nuclearized
capability, Iran’s missile program is largely for deterrence purposes. Hence, the United States should lower
the political temperature about the Iranian “missile
threat” and learn to live with it while pressing countries not to sell Iran any components that could help it
take this program to a more advanced stage.
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Focus Attention on, and Bring Iran into
Negotiations Over, Regional Conflicts
The Israel and Palestine Conflict
While keeping the nuclear deal intact, Washington
should focus on Iran’s regional activities that it and
its allies consider to be a threat. The real and immediate problems that the United States faces with Iran
is its support for terrorist groups as well as radical
Shia groups that have emerged as a result of conflicts
in the region. As mentioned earlier, Iran continues to
support groups like Hezbollah and Palestinian Islamic
Jihad, and has long-standing relationships with both.
Although Hezbollah is busy these days supporting the
Assad government in fighting Syrian Sunni rebels as
well as ISIS units on or near the Lebanese border with
Syria, its receipt of Iranian arms and financial assistance over the years has helped to fuel several miniwars with Israel in the past and could do so again in
the future.70 Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza has been
known to fire rockets into Israel even at times when
Hamas, which controls the Gaza Strip, has entered into
a truce with Israel, as a way of fomenting tensions.71
Although Iran is unlikely to be persuaded to desist
from supporting some Palestinian groups and Hezbollah, considering them to be resistance groups against
Israel, bringing Iran into negotiations over the future
of Syria can be a way to address its support for Hezbollah that is deeply involved in the Syrian crisis. If a
compromise settlement can be reached on Syria, one
that would leave the Assad government in charge of
Damascus and some other areas of Syria, Iran might
be mollified because it would still be able to retain a
degree of influence in that country. U.S. and European
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officials, possibly with the backing of Russia, could
then try to persuade Iran to lessen its support for Hezbollah or at least counsel Hezbollah not to start a new
conflict with Israel that would again throw the region
into chaos. Iran already knows that Israel has hit Hezbollah targets in Syria over the past few years, and,
while Hezbollah could inflict pain on Israel through
a barrage of rocket attacks as it did in 2006, Israel still
remains the dominant military power in that region.
Hence, bringing Iran into discussions on the future
of Syria, while not a formula for ending the IranHezbollah relationship, could possibly preclude
another Israeli-Hezbollah military confrontation.
As for the Palestinians, the recent rapprochement
between Hamas and Fatah, if successful, could isolate
Palestinian Islamic Jihad further. Iran would have to
think long and hard if it would want to use the Palestinian Islamic Jihad as a spoiler, which runs the risk
of alienating the majority of Palestinians. U.S. officials
could raise the issue of Iran’s support for Palestinian
Islamic Jihad on the sidelines of a conference on Syria,
and urge Tehran to lessen its support for this group.
Sectarian conflicts persist in the Gulf. U.S. policymakers should try to facilitate talks between Iran and
the Gulf Arab states over Iran’s support for some militant Shia groups in the Gulf as well as the repression
of Shia communities in these states. This would ease
Saudi concerns about internal subversive activities in
their own country as well as those of its neighbors, but
in order for such talks to succeed, the situation of the
Shia in these countries would have to be addressed.
Although most Shia in Bahrain have remained peaceful, even during this current phase of repression, there
is a small radical fringe that believes in violence. The
Bahraini authorities have arrested and killed some of
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these violent operatives, some of whom have allegedly
received training in Iran.72 Other Gulf countries have
also alleged being the object of Iranian intelligence
operations. On August 12, 2017, Kuwait, for example,
announced that it had recaptured 12 people, all Shiites, who had been convicted in a 2015 case and who
were allegedly involving an Iranian intelligence operation after a safe house was discovered containing
guns and explosives.73 As for the Saudis, they tend to
see any Shia protest or disturbance as having an Iranian hand behind it, regardless of the actual circumstances. Thus, it is difficult to ascertain whether claims
of Iranian subversion in the kingdom are true or not.
As mentioned earlier, the Shia in the Gulf have legitimate grievances without being stoked by Iran, but Iran
often capitalizes on these grievances to try to extend
its influence in these communities. Because Iran and
Saudi Arabia were able to come to an understanding
in 2017 over the hajj, which took place without incident, it is not inconceivable that they could come to
some type of understanding or even an agreement on
the Shia issue in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states.
Ultimately, this would involve an Iranian pledge not
to engage in covert activities among the Shia of the
area while Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf Arab states
commit to improving the political and economic status
of their Shia communities. Admittedly, reaching such
an understanding would be a long shot given the present environment, but, as mentioned earlier, an Iranian-Saudi rapprochement did take place in the 1990s
and could possibly take place in the near future if all
of the parties, including the United States, come to
the realization that easing of tensions is better than
confrontation.
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On Iraq, the United States can work more closely
with Saudi Arabia to lessen the Iraqi Government’s
dependence on Iran, which would help reduce
Riyadh’s concerns about Iranian influence there. Iran
has been heavily involved through its Quds force (the
intelligence arm of the IRGC) in training and equipping
the so-called Population Mobilization Forces made up
of mostly Iraqi Shia volunteers.74 These units played a
key role in defending Baghdad in the summer of 2014
when ISIS was on the march, and have played important roles in fighting ISIS in the northern and western
part of Iraq over the past 3 years. Iraqi Prime Minister
Abadi has a delicate role to play with regard to these
militias, some of which are tied to various pro-Iranian
Shia political groups in Iraq. He wants to build up and
make more competent the regular Iraqi Army with
U.S. support (which has been ongoing since 2014) and
probably does not like the fact that the Popular Mobilization Forces, while part of the anti-ISIS campaign,
answer more to the Iranians in some cases than to the
Iraqi Government. Indeed, a number of Shia groups
and leaders in Iraq, including Ayatollah al-Sistani,
want to lessen Iran’s role in Iraq.75 Over the last year,
Saudi Arabia has recognized this trend and has tried
to cultivate a friendship not only with Abadi but also
with radical Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, who was once
an ally of Iran. Both were invited to Riyadh in 2017.76
The United States should continue to encourage this
Saudi policy. Although U.S. policymakers would like
the Popular Mobilization Forces disbanded or melded
into the regular army, they seem to understand that
Abadi is in a tight spot because some of these forces
have prominent backers in the Iraqi Shia community.
The United States should be patient with Abadi and
allow him time to deal with the Popular Mobilization
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Forces at his own pace, and should counsel the Saudis
not to put unrealistic pressure on him over the same
issue. U.S. policymakers and Saudi officials should
also understand that it is unrealistic for Abadi or any
Shia politician to try to completely eliminate Iranian
influence in Iraq, given Iran’s ties to several of Iraqi
Shia groups and its economic and religious links to the
country. For example, thousands of Iranians travel to
southern Iraq every year to visit the Shiite holy sites
in the country. Moreover, a policy to break Iraq’s ties
to Iran would almost certainly elicit a strong Iranian
response that could be carried out through its proxies
inside Iraq.
On Syria, as mentioned earlier, U.S. policymakers
should seek a political solution to the crisis that would
involve Iran. Iran has played a role in shoring up the
military capabilities of the Assad government not only
by sending IRGC operatives to Syria but in coordinating the logistics and training of Shia elements from
various countries, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, into
militias fighting on behalf of Assad. The United States
has prudently acted cautiously toward these Shia militias, and the few clashes that have taken place between
U.S. forces and these militias have only occurred when
the former have felt threatened, but these few clashes
have not escalated into a conflagration.77 However,
some U.S. policymakers hold out the hope that the
Syrian crisis can be solved by excluding Iran altogether,
which is not realistic. As long as the Assad government
remains in power, Iran is going to have some influence
in Syria, but the longer the conflict drags on, the more
Iran’s influence grows because the Assad government
needs the pro-Iran militias, including Hezbollah, to
fight on its side.
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Syria is a complicated puzzle, with some groups
fighting against common enemies while others are
fighting among themselves. Once ISIS is defeated in
Syria, there will still be various militia and rebel forces
in the country pursuing different objectives, including
pro-Iranian and pro-Saudi groups. Iran would like the
Assad government to last and take back more Syrian
territory while the Saudis would like Assad to step
down from power and have a Sunni group take over
the government. These are seemingly irreconcilable
positions, but Syria is such a divided country that the
current situation of pockets of territory under the control of particular groups could last for some time. U.S.
policymakers should convince the Saudis that bringing the Iranians into negotiations for a political solution to the Syrian crisis would be preferable to keeping
them out where they would have more of an incentive
to cause mischief.
Placating Saudi Arabia
As for Saudi Arabia, the United States needs to play
the role of a big brother who is protective of his sibling
and advises him not to get into trouble. The way this
could be done is for U.S. policymakers to underscore
to the Saudis that U.S. forces will remain in the region
as the ultimate protector of the Saudi kingdom, and
will continue to have a robust naval presence in the
Gulf to keep Iran in check and to keep the Straits of
Hormuz as well as the Bab el-Mandab (connecting the
Arabian Sea to the Red Sea) open to international traffic. The United States should also pledge to the Saudis
that it will do all it can to compel the IAEA to continue
its robust monitoring of the Iran nuclear deal to make
sure Tehran is complying with all of its provisions and
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limitations on its nuclear program. The United States
can also offer the Saudis more joint military training
exercises as a way of reassuring the U.S. commitment
to Saudi Arabia’s security. At the same time, the United
States should counsel the Saudis not to embark on any
more military ventures that have become disasters like
the Yemen conflict. Saudi and Emirati military intervention in Yemen has not led to any significant military
breakthroughs except for the capture of some slivers
of territory by forces loyal to the Hadi government.
Although there are now tensions between the Houthis
and Saleh’s forces,78 these two groups are unlikely to
split apart to allow Hadi, backed by the Saudis and Emiratis, to come back into power. This military stalemate
apparently led Defense Secretary Mattis to conclude,
and say so publicly in Riyadh, that the Yemeni conflict
“needs a political solution.”79 In addition, the United
States should advise the Saudis in private to end discriminatory policies toward its own Shia community
not only because it would work toward ending internal
strife in the kingdom, but also because it would deny
Iran a role in exploiting Shia grievances for their own
purposes. As mentioned earlier, if Saudi-Iranian tensions ease, the United States could perhaps play a role
in facilitating an understanding between the Saudis
and the other Gulf Arab countries and Iran whereby
Iran pledges to cease covert support for Shia militants
in the Gulf while these Gulf Arab countries pledge to
ease the repression and improve the lot of their own
Shia communities.
The Yemen problem remains a serious problem in
the region over which Saudi-Iranian relations are particularly tense. The Saudis are insisting that Iran not
play any role in a Yemeni settlement, but this stance is
shortsighted.80 If the reason for Saudi intervention in
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Yemen was Iran’s assistance to the Houthi rebels, then
the Saudis cannot then say Iran should have no role
in the negotiations if the Saudis themselves are serious about a negotiated settlement. The U.S. position
should be that a settlement should involve all parties
to the conflict. The same should be said for the case for
Syria, as mentioned earlier. Without buy-in from the
regional players, plus the Yemeni and Syrian groups
on the ground, neither the Yemen nor the Syrian conflict will be settled via a political settlement.
Continued violence in both Yemen and Syria not
only will cause more humanitarian crises but could
also spill over into other areas, creating even more
instability in the region. U.S. policymakers should use
their influence with the Saudis to come to the negotiating table and persuade them not to veto an Iranian role. U.S. policymakers should understand that,
however undesirable it is for them to countenance an
Iranian role in negotiations, it is better to have the Iranians play a constructive role than a destructive one in
regional affairs. In this vein, U.S. policymakers should
desist from criticizing the Iran nuclear deal and desist
from saying that they will pull out of it. Quietly allowing the nuclear deal to remain as is would have the
effect of toning down the rather harsh rhetoric that has
emerged in both Washington and Tehran as of late.81
This would then allow U.S. officials to talk with the Iranians about a settlement to both the Yemen and Syrian
conflicts and to be supportive of each other’s presence, not necessarily of their policies, at the negotiating table. If U.S. and Iranian diplomats could hammer
out a complicated nuclear deal, they can certainly try
their best to figure out a political roadmap and an
ultimate settlement for these two conflicts. Under the
Obama administration, Iran was included in some
international meetings on the Syrian crisis, and so it
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would not be a stretch to include Iran in a new round
of negotiations.
If these negotiations go well, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and
other Gulf Arab states, plus the United States, could
also address the issue of Iranian subversive activities in
some of the GCC states. But for such talks to succeed,
the Gulf Arab states would also have to listen to Iran’s
concern about the situation of the Shia communities in
these states. Although this is a tall order, it could be
tackled if there first is progress on Syria and Yemen.
Critics of this approach will undoubtedly say that
bringing Iranians in, as opposed to keeping them out,
will merely solidify their gains in the Arab world
where they will carry on with their nefarious activities, but the Iranians are already involved in these
areas anyway. It is better to know their intentions and
find ways to modify them than to treat them as perpetual enemies and always be reacting to their moves.
If negotiations succeed in both the Yemen and Syrian
cases involving the Saudis and the Iranians, then there
could also be opportunities to lessen tensions between
these two counties in the Gulf region where they can
find some accommodation.
The recent agreement between Iran and Saudi
Arabia to allow Iranian pilgrims to participate in this
year’s hajj, despite the two countries lack of formal diplomatic relations, gives hope that they could possibly
find common ground on other issues. As the history
of Saudi-Iranian relations have shown in the first part
of this monograph, the two countries may be rivals,
but they do not have to be enemies. U.S. policymakers
should encourage such cooperation and support more
of it instead of blindly following hardline Saudi policies (like the recent Saudi-led effort to isolate Qatar)
and military ventures that have caused state-to-state
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conflicts and sectarian tensions to rise in the region. A
more stable region would be in the U.S. national security interest by lessening the chances of war and interventions, and keeping the vital sea lanes—not just in
the Gulf but also in the Red Sea—open.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE U.S. ARMY
The recommendations for U.S. policymakers in this
monograph are bound to make Saudi Arabia nervous
that the United States would be distancing itself from
the kingdom while seeking a major accommodation
with Iran. Although such an interpretation of these
recommendations is exaggerated, especially as a significant U.S. accommodation with Iran is not likely in
the near future for a variety of reasons, U.S. policymakers need to assure the Saudis that they would still have
their back as they seek to bring Iran into negotiations
on regional conflicts.
Here a role for the U.S. Army comes into play.
Although an Iranian invasion of Saudi Arabia is
unlikely, U.S. Army trainers can work with their Saudi
counterparts to train for such a contingency. This can
be done via exercises within the kingdom—preferably
in remote areas so as not to spur opposition in the country from elements who oppose U.S. troops (the U.S.
troop presence in Saudi Arabia in the 1990s became a
contentious issue)82 or by bringing Saudi military units
to the United States and train them at U.S. Army bases.
Employing the U.S. Army’s Stability Force Assistance Brigades (SFAB) created in 2017 to assist Saudi
Arabia’s ground forces may also be a way to reassure
the Saudis of the U.S. commitment to their security.
SFABs are to be permanent units designed to conduct
security cooperation activities with friendly nations
to train, advise, and assist their army components.
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By training for contingency operations, they can be
quickly deployed overseas to aid partners in various
operations, including counterinsurgency operations.
Having dedicated units that can respond quickly in
case of threats to Saudi Arabia would undoubtedly
ease Saudi concerns about Iran and Iranian-supported
forces.
Concerning immediate threats, U.S. Army Special
Forces can work with the Saudi Army on ways to protect its border with Yemen better, especially areas along
the northern Yemeni border that are adjacent to the
Houthi heartland in Yemen. Having this border area
strengthened would not only reassure the Saudis that
the Houthis would not be able to stage attacks against
Saudi Arabia from this region, but would underscore
the U.S. commitment to safeguarding Saudi Arabia’s
territorial integrity.
In working closely with Saudi military units, U.S.
Army officers should avoid getting into discussions
with their Saudi counterparts about the Houthis as
a dangerous “Shia” group. Although many Saudis
will likely make disparaging remarks about the Shia,
U.S. officers should try to avoid such discussions and
instead steer their talks with the Saudi counterparts
to effective ways to protect the Saudi kingdom geostrategically, not theologically, for the reasons outlined
in this monograph.
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